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Abstract When should a scientific community be cognitively diverse? This
article presents a model for studying how the heterogeneity of learning heuris-
tics used by scientist agents affects the epistemic efficiency of a scientific com-
munity. By extending the epistemic landscapes modeling approach introduced
by Weisberg and Muldoon, the article casts light on the micro-mechanisms me-
diating cognitive diversity, coordination, and problem-solving efficiency. The
results suggest that social learning and cognitive diversity produce epistemic
benefits only when the epistemic community is faced with problems of suffi-
cient difficulty.
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1 Introduction: Why scientific communities should be diverse
The rationality of individual scientists is neither a sufficient nor necessary
condition for achieving good collective outcomes in research. The literature on
the social epistemology of science even suggests that having egoistic, stubborn,
or otherwise epistemologically sullied agents as members of a scientific com-
munity can – under appropriate conditions – improve its epistemic efficiency
(Weisberg 2010; Mayo-Wilson et al 2011). In such cases, the increase in the
efficiency of knowledge production capacities of the community is often due to
its increased diversity.
As especially feminist social epistemologists have emphasized, differences
in how people see the world due to their different backgrounds, social identity,
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and gender are a precondition for effective critical discourse, and hence impor-
tant for avoiding bias and producing objective scientific knowledge (Longino
1990, 2002).1 Solving complex scientific problems often requires that they are
attacked with a wide range of different research approaches (Solomon 2006;
Page 2008), and in many cases, the connection between diversity in general
and efficiency of collective problem-solving appears to be mediated by factors
such as variation in background beliefs, concepts used, and reasoning styles
of scientists, that is, cognitive diversity. The model presented in this article
shows how a particular aspect of cognitive diversity – agents’ different learn-
ing heuristics – affects the epistemic division of labor within a community and
thereby influences the epistemic performance of the community in different
kinds of research domains.
Let us begin by considering a few examples. According to the popular per-
ception of science, scientific discoveries arise from flashes of insight by excep-
tional individuals. For example, Nikola Tesla has long been thought of as a lone
genius, whose numerous scientific and technological inventions appeared to
arise mainly from his independent inquiries into the nature of electro-magnetic
phenomena (Novak 2014). The lone genius model seems to also apply to Yitang
Zhang, an unknown mathematician who in April 2013 proved a weaker variant
of the twin prime conjecture, a great result in the history of number theory
that had widely been regarded as too difficult to solve with the current re-
sources of mathematics. In interviews after receiving the MacArthur award for
his accomplishment, Zhang has attributed his success mainly to perseverance,
refusing to switch topics even after long stretches of time with no progress on
a problem (Klarreich 2013; MacArthur-Foundation 2014).
However, for the most part contemporary scientific research is far from a
solitary endeavor. By talking to supervisors, colleagues, reading journals and
going to conferences, academic researchers are constantly collecting new ideas
from others, and on the lookout for ways to improve their research based on
social feedback. We are often happy to align our research questions, methods,
and theories with those of others in order to produce scientific results of at
least moderate significance and impact. And as history of science shows, often
even major breakthroughs in science have resulted not from solitary work but
from bricolage, skillful and often lucky combination of ideas from a variety of
sources (cf. Johnson 2011).
These examples illustrate what I mean by scientists having different learn-
ing heuristics. Since resources and time are always limited, each scientist re-
peatedly faces a decision of how to conduct her research: whether she should
spend the day at the bench running experiments and analyzing her data,
or whether to engage in social learning. It appears that successful commu-
nal knowledge production needs both individual and social learners. On the
one hand, laying the foundations for new paradigms and scientific revolutions
requires that a scientist or a group of scientists goes against the grain and
1 Diversity in science obviously matters also beyond strictly epistemological concerns.
For example, it can help fight epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007) and promote institutional
epistemic virtues, e.g., by reducing prejudice and ethnocentrism (Anderson 1995).
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develops new ways of thinking independently of the existing paradigm. On
the other hand, efficient problem-solving in normal scientific research requires
that a large share of research work is allocated to the currently most promis-
ing research approaches. But how much social learning should there be in a
scientific community, and when should it occur?
To study the effects of the different research strategies on epistemic perfor-
mance, I adopt a population-modeling approach to scientific problem-solving.
This approach treats the scientific community in a research field as an epis-
temic system (cf. Goldman 2011). Scientific knowledge is not understood as
residing primarily at the level of individuals, but instead, it is treated as a
system property, determined both by the work done by individual scientist
as well as the adequacy of their social coordination and division of cognitive
labor (Polanyi 1962; Hull 1988; Longino 2002).
More precisely, the systems approach to the epistemology of science sug-
gests the hypothesis that the efficiency of a scientific community is determined
by at least three kinds of factors:
1. The distribution of the cognitive properties of individual agents in the
community (cognitive diversity)
2. The organizational properties of the community (e.g., its communication
structure, reward system)
3. The nature and difficulty of the problem-solving task faced by the commu-
nity.
The model presented in this article examines the dependencies between these
factors and the problem-solving capacity of a scientific community.
Since Philip Kitcher’s (1990; 1993) seminal work on the topic, diversity and
the social organization of science have been discussed within a variety of mod-
els and modeling frameworks (Strevens 2003; Weisberg and Muldoon 2009;
Zollman 2010; De Langhe 2014; Muldoon 2013). Among these different mod-
eling approaches, currently the most amenable framework for studying diverse
learning heuristics in science is the epistemic landscapes model (EL model)
by Michael Weisberg and Ryan Muldoon (2009), which represents scientific
research as a population of scientist agents foraging on an epistemic land-
scape. The current article extends this modeling approach in two ways. First,
I argue that the EL model (i) suffers from several interpretational problems,
(ii) builds on problematic assumptions about the behavioral rules followed by
scientist agents, and (iii) applies to an overly narrow set of research topics.
Secondly, by introducing new assumptions regarding the implementation of
the social-learning heuristics, measurement of epistemic performance, and the
complexity of research topics, the broadcasting model (introduced in Section
3) aims to provide a more applicable account of the micro-mechanisms medi-
ating cognitive diversity, division of cognitive labor, and epistemic success.
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2 Research as foraging on an epistemic landscape
There are a number of reasons why epistemic landscape modeling is especially
suitable for studying the effects of cognitive diversity on collective epistemic
performance: First, unlike many other models, the framework is capable of
representing genuine cooperation, not only competition, between agents (cf.
D’Agostino 2009). Secondly, the agent-based approach allows for a natural
representation of bounded rationality and cognitive diversity in terms of dif-
ferent learning heuristics employed by agents. Thirdly, unlike the otherwise
elegant NK models used in some alternative approaches (Alexander et al 2015;
Lazer and Friedman 2007; Page 2008), the three-dimensional representation
of the fitness landscape allows easy manipulation of the epistemic structure
of the studied research field (landscape topography). This is crucial for the
experiments I run with my model. Let us begin by examining how scientific
research, cognitive diversity, and division of cognitive labor can be represented
in epistemic landscapes modeling.
2.1 The original EL model
As in most agent-based simulations, the model primitives in the EL model
concern the attributes and behavior of agents, and the structure of their en-
vironment. Generally, the model builds on an analogy to fitness landscape
models used in ecology: Collective search is portrayed as the movement of a
population on a landscape, where the height parameter of a particular envi-
ronment point represents its fitness value (Wright 1932).
Applied to the social epistemology of science, the model is interpreted as
follows: A scientific research topic (e.g. synthetic biology, astrophysics, en-
docrinology) is represented as an n-dimensional space, where the dimensions
up to n 1 constitute the different aspects of a research approach. For example,
attempting to synthesize novel DNA nucleotides and studying the stability of
these molecules by computational methods are independent but both neces-
sary research approaches in synthetic biology (Weisberg and Muldoon 2009).
The last (n:th) dimension stands for the epistemic significance of the ap-
proach. Here epistemic significance is understood according to Philip Kitcher’s
(1993, Ch. 4) analysis: Significant statements are the ones which answer signifi-
cant questions. Significant questions, in turn, are ones that help us uncover the
structure of the world, or at least organize our experience of it. Respectively,
we can define the significance of a research approach as the significance of truth
(or truths) that can be uncovered by using the approach. If we, furthermore,
make the idealizing assumption that the scientists working in a field share the
same judgments about significance, it is possible to represent the community
as populating and perceiving a shared epistemic landscape.
For the sake of simplicity, in the model the large number of dimensions
defining an approach are collapsed into two, and hence a three-dimensional
landscape can be used to represent the epistemic structure of the research
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topic at hand. Furthermore, the space is divided into discrete patches, where
each patch represents a combination of (i) a research question being inves-
tigated, (ii) instruments and methods for gathering and analyzing data, and
(iii) background theories used to interpret the data. The greater the elevation
of a particular patch, the more significant truths the research done by using
that approach discloses. The simulations that Weisberg and Muldoon report in
their paper concern a smooth, mostly flat landscape with two Gaussian-shaped
hills of positive epistemic significance.
An important difference to many other models in recent social epistemology
is that in epistemic landscape modeling, agents are not portrayed as Bayesian
conditionalizers or competent maximizers of expected utility. Instead, bounded
rationality is implemented in the following way. Initially all of the agents work-
ing on the research topic are placed randomly on zero significance areas of the
landscape, and at each turn of the simulation, they move at a velocity which
is small compared to the size of the landscape. Their movement is guided by a
satisficing search for increasing epistemic significance in their Moore neighbor-
hood. This search-based implementation of learning embodies an assumption
about the local nature of information available to scientists when deciding
about how to proceed about their future research: Changing one’s research
approach is a gradual and costly process, and no individual agent has access
to global information about how epistemic significance is distributed on the
landscape, i.e. what the most effective research approaches are.
Although the notion of cognitive diversity could be seen to include a variety
of factors ranging from background beliefs, training and education, perception
of significance, to general intellectual style, and so on, the EL model actually
focuses on one particular type of cognitive diversity, variation in the scientists’
research heuristics in terms of individual and social learning.2 While this is by
no means the only important source of cognitive diversity, epistemic landscape
models do show how it brings about and maintains another kind of diversity
in the research field – division of cognitive labor, i.e., the distribution of agents
over different research approaches (Alexander et al 2015, pp. 436–437).
In the EL model, the diversity in learning heuristics is implemented in
terms of three kinds of agents (controls, followers, and mavericks) correspond-
ing to different rules for engaging in individual and social learning. In this case,
when conducting individual learning, agents search for epistemically significant
results by interacting with nature, so to speak (e.g., by gradually improving
their methods, experimenting with changes in instrumentation, and in their
theoretical assumptions). Social learning, in turn, refers to improving one’s re-
search approach based on the exchange of information with other agents (e.g.,
by reading publications of other scientists). In the EL model, both individual
and social learning are represented as variations of gradient-climbing on the
2 This same aspect of cognitive diversity is also the topic of the subsequent epistemic
landscape models introduced by Thoma (2015) and Alexander et al (2015). Zollman (2010),
in contrast, deals with a different aspect of diversity. In the context of theory choice, he
examines how (a) the flow of information in social networks and (b) the strength of agents’
prior degrees of belief influence the emergence of consensus in theory choice.
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landscape. Control agents ignore all social information, while followers pre-
fer patches already visited by others, and mavericks avoid already examined
approaches.
The most striking finding suggested by the model is that maverick scientists
immensely improve the problem-solving efficiency of the scientific community.
Intuitively, the EL model suggests that the researcher population benefits from
the presence of explorer members who explicitly avoid methods and approaches
employed by others. However, the simulations by Weisberg and Muldoon also
imply a much stronger claim, according to which a homogeneous population of
mavericks is more efficient than a diverse community consisting of both follow-
ers and mavericks. Both these results have been shown to be open to various
kinds of criticism, and assumptions in the model regarding both the search
rules of agents and the topography of the landscape have been challenged.
First, as shown by their critics, some of the central results of Weisberg
and Muldoon’s Netlogo simulation arise from implementation errors in the
control and follower search rules (Alexander et al 2015). Moreover, as Thoma
(2015) suggests, alternative forms of the search rules which appear to be just
as compatible with actual scientists’ behavior as those suggested by Weis-
berg and Muldoon, lead to clearly different outcomes. The general applica-
bility of results from the EL model is further compromised by the fact that
in the absence of robustness analysis (Grimm and Berger 2015), Weisberg
and Muldoon’s published findings are not sufficient for establishing that their
results follow from the substantial assumptions of the model, and not from
implementation-related auxiliary assumptions. On the contrary, the fact that
the model structure is borrowed from another domain (ecology) raises the
worry that at least some of the results might be artifacts produced by the
imported modeling framework itself.
2.2 What does an epistemic landscape represent?
Another set of worries concerns the landscape and its interpretation. The
choices that Weisberg and Muldoon make about landscape topography in
their simulations are more controversial than they admit, as those choices
stand for crucial assumptions about the epistemic structure of the research
topic (Alexander et al 2015). Epistemic landscapes underlying real scientific
research probably involve a greater number of interdependencies between the
elements of approaches (questions, instruments, methods, theories) than the
smooth two-dimensional landscape can represent. Consequently, results from
the EL model are conditional on the choice of particular kinds of simple re-
search topics, which might often not be the ones encountered in cutting-edge
scientific research.
However, when Alexander and his coauthors treat the EL model as a special
case of NK landscapes (2015, p.446), they risk falling prey to another misin-
terpretation of the landscape idea. In typical applications, NK landscapes are
used to represent a search space for a problem, where hill-climbing towards
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maxima points is interpreted as a search for better solutions to the problem,
i.e., minimization of the error function (Lazer and Friedman 2007; Kauffman
and Levin 1987). Although Alexander et al. purport to reinterpret the NK
landscape as an epistemic landscape, in fact they still use their model to rep-
resent interdependencies between a set of propositions. Although it remains
somewhat unclear what the global performance measured by their simulations
refers to, their results against the usefulness of social learning seem to rely on
observations about the effect of social learning on how quickly and how often
the agents find the peaks on rugged landscapes.
As I argue below, such a measure tracks the wrong property – success
on an epistemic landscape is more subtle. A landscape does not represent
a search space for a single problem (where patches correspond to different
states of the belief vector of an agent, as Alexander et al. suggest). Instead,
the landscape stands for a distribution of epistemic significance over a set of
different but complementary research approaches. The EL model is not (or at
least it should not be) primarily used to study the performance of individual
agents and whether they find the peaks on the landscape. Instead, the modeling
results concern the dependency between cognitive diversity and coordination,
where coordination refers to the distribution of agents on non-zero parts of
the landscape. Consequently, the global maximum on an epistemic landscape
should not be understood as the “correct solution to the problem.” There
is simply not a single problem to solve. What the maximum (when unique)
stands for is the most productive way to advance the inquiry on a research
topic.
2.3 Measuring collective epistemic performance
Keeping in sight this coherent interpretation of the landscape suggests that
both of the ways that Weisberg and Muldoon measure the epistemic success
or efficiency of a scientist population are inadequate, or at least insufficient,
as they track very particular aspects of success. First, Weisberg and Muldoon
study (i) how often and (ii) how quickly peaks are reached. As argued above, (i)
and (ii) do not directly measure community-level epistemic success: A situation
where the whole population quickly lands on the global maximum looks good
by these measures, but the coordination between the agents is very poor.
Imagine, for example, a population of synthetic biologists all of whom converge
on doing the same kind of computational modeling work, because at a certain
time, that is what produces the most epistemic significance. In such a situation
there would be no division of labor, and the success of such a strategy would
surely prove short-lived.
The other measure, epistemic progress, defined as the proportion of ex-
plored non-zero patches on the landscape, captures the coordination aspect
better. However, this measure disregards the epistemic significance level of
the explored patches (as long as it is not zero). Consequently, beyond the
simple landscape studied by Weisberg and Muldoon, epistemic progress can
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be a misleading measure of success. To see why, imagine a situation where
there is a certain number of dead-end research approaches within the research
field, that is, research approaches of low epistemic significance surrounded by
even worse alternatives. Due to factors such as badly formulated research ques-
tions and inappropriately chosen instrumentation and analysis methods, such
low-significance research approaches where no incremental change can improve
the approach are likely to crop up in all non-trivial scientific research fields.
The resulting dead-end approaches can be represented as local maxima on the
landscape (figure 1).
In general, there are often interdependencies between aspects of research
approaches, which cannot be captured by Weisberg and Muldoon’s smooth
landscape. For example, certain experimental approaches might be useful only
when used with a particular data analysis method and background theory. If
we assume that aspects of research approaches are mapped on each dimension
of a landscape so that similarity with respect to a particular aspect is rep-
resented by distance along that axis, postulating a smooth landscape would
amount to assuming that the interdependencies mentioned above do not arise
in the particular research field. Hence, rugged landscapes characterized by sev-
eral local maxima can more faithfully represent the complex problem-solving
situations faced by scientific researchers (cf. Alexander et al 2015).3
What epistemic progress, as it is defined by Weisberg and Muldoon, fails
to convey is whether the population has found areas of high epistemic signifi-
cance, or whether all of the explored patches reside on low significance areas
surrounding the dead-end approaches. Although these difficulties do not arise
on smooth landscapes, on rugged ones epistemic progress is not an adequate
way to measure the collective performance of an epistemic community.
2.4 Behavioral rules of agents
Finally, the model behavior resulting from adding dead-end approaches on the
landscape also suggests that the search rules of agents implemented in the
EL model are only applicable to the simplest epistemic landscapes. It is well
known that gradient-climbing search is sensitive to local maxima and fails
to find global maxima on rugged landscapes (Russell and Norvig 2003, Ch.
4.4.1). As all three behavioral rules of the agents in the EL model rely only on
local-search based hill climbing, they cannot capture the research heuristics
employed by scientists working on more complex research topics.
I conclude this section by reporting on a modeling experiment which sug-
gests that the radical results obtained by Weisberg and Muldoon might be,
at least partly, artifacts of the problematic aspects of their model discussed
above.
3 For more general discussions of the use of rugged landscapes in problem-solving research,
see, e.g., Page (2008, Ch.1), and Lazer and Friedman (2007).
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Fig. 1 Landscape with dead-end research approaches
2.5 Are mavericks unbeatable?
Weisberg and Muldoon’s most striking finding is that a homogeneous popu-
lation of maverick agents is epistemically superior to all mixed populations
of controls, followers, and mavericks. Intuitively, this result follows almost
trivially from the fact that epistemic progress is measured in terms of the
proportion of explored patches on the landscape, and the maverick movement
rule is tailored to maximize the efficiency of exploration. Let us, however, in-
troduce a small cost of exploration into the model – for example a delay of
ten time steps when an agent enters an unexplored patch. In the next sec-
tion I will return to the question of how to measure epistemic success, but for
now, let us, instead of epistemic progress, keep track of the average epistemic
significance of the population (calculated as the mean of the elevations of in-
dividual agents) over time. It now turns out that the cost of exploration can
make a mixed population of followers and mavericks more efficient than a pure
maverick population (Figure 2). With this particular delay value (td = 10), a
diverse population consisting of 50-50-mix of trailblazing mavericks and faster
followers lands most quickly on high-significance areas.4
Furthermore, Figure 2 also shows that once the implementation errors in
the search rule for control agents have been corrected (cf. Alexander et al
2015), controls perform even slightly better in the mixed population than
maverick agents do. It appears that when exploration is more costly than
4 For a Python replication of Weisberg and Muldoon’s model, and the source code for the
simulations in this article, see the repository at https://github.com/samulipo/broadcasting/.
Simulations were conducted with n=50 for each data point. Error bars (when shown) stand
for one standard deviation in sample.
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Fig. 2 EL model with cost of exploration. Progress measured as average epistemic signifi-
cance of the population after 200 time steps.
exploitation, simple hill-climbing is a better strategy than a similar strategy
biased toward avoiding already explored approaches. In sum, small modifi-
cations of the model compromise the generality of Weisberg and Muldoon’s
result that a large proportion of maverick scientists in an epistemic community
drastically improves its performance.
3 The broadcasting model
The broadcasting model differs from the EL model with respect to (i) how
epistemic success is measured, (ii) which landscapes are studied, and (iii) what
the search rules employed by the agents are. In doing so, it avoids the problems
discussed in the previous section.
I begin with measurement and landscape topography. I suggest that a
quantity, which can be called the epistemic work done by an individual agent
(and aggregated into the epistemic work done by the community), is a mean-
ingful and coherent measure of success. Given the characterization of epistemic
significance in Section 2.1, it seems that a population of scientist agents can be
said to be the more successful the more significant truths the agents can com-
munally uncover, and the efficiency of the community is determined by how
quickly the accumulation of truths is done. I define epistemic work wi done by
an agent i since the beginning of the simulation as the sum of the epistemic
significances of the patches visited by the agent until time t, weighted by a
constant time scale factor  2 [0; 1]. Hence for the agent i, wi;t =
Pt
=0 si; ,
where si; is the significance of the patch visited by agent i at time  . The
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epistemic work Wt done by the population at time t is simply the sum of work
done by the individual agents.5
Measuring epistemic efficiency in terms of epistemic work over time is,
alone, not sufficient for capturing the need for genuine coordination or di-
vision of labor between scientists. Like success in finding peaks, epistemic
work could also be maximized by minimizing coordination and guiding the
whole population to the global maximum. To capture the dynamics of the
division of labor, adopting a research approach that has already been used by
another scientist should be associated with diminishing marginal returns. In
order to represent this assumption that research done using a particular ap-
proach decreases the payoff from further research with the same approach, let
us introduce landscape depletion: When an agent receives the amount si; of
epistemic payoff by visiting a patch, the same amount of “significance mass”
is removed from the landscape. In the current simulation, this was done by
lowering the elevation of the patch in question by the same amount. The co-
efficient  determines how quickly depletion occurs: the smaller  is, the more
time it takes to deplete a patch.6
I have two main reasons for adopting this new measure of epistemic suc-
cess. First, epistemic work avoids the rather serious conceptual problems with
Weisberg and Muldoon’s two original measures. Secondly, it allows a more
natural interpretation of what it means to visit a patch. By not attributing
any epistemic payoff to revisiting a patch, Weisberg and Muldoon are drawn
to suggest one of two implausible ideas: Either that there’s only one signifi-
cant truth to be uncovered per research approach (2009, footnote 3), or that
all of the significant truths from an approach are always uncovered within one
time step of the simulation. In contrast, together epistemic work and land-
scape depletion allow for a plausible interpretation of collective search on the
landscape: What matters for epistemic advancement is that an agent spends
a unit of time on a patch of considerable epistemic significance – not only the
fact that a non-zero patch has been visited. That is, collective problem-solving
is advanced when a scientist spends some time applying a significant research
approach to a meaningful problem. A core challenge of division of cognitive la-
bor within a community can hence be formulated in the language of my model:
How, as a community, should the scientists organize their joint work so that
they can harvest as much significance mass from the landscape as quickly as
possible?
The third major difference to the EL model concerns the learning heuristics
used by the agents. As discussed above, all social learning in the EL model
occurs by studying traces left by other agents in one’s Moore neighborhood.
That is hardly a well-founded assumption. As specified by Weisberg and Mul-
5 Consequently, the average epistemic significance of the population at a particular time
(used in Section 2.3) is the change in W over one time step, scaled by a constant.
6 Weisberg and Muldoon (2009, p.232), suggest implementing such interaction between
agents and landscape as a possible extension of their model. Likewise, Thoma (2015, footnote
7) brings up the idea of a modified model where revisiting patches uncovers further epistemic
significance, but she does not develop the idea further.
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doon, a single epistemic landscape represents a rather constrained research
topic (e.g., the study of opioid receptors in chemical biology, or critical phe-
nomena in statistical physics), and so it can safely be assumed that researchers
are aware of each others’ work. There is no reason for social learning to be
constrained only to agents who use approaches very similar to one’s own (cf.
Thoma 2015).
In the broadcasting model, the cognitive diversity in the population per-
tains to the agents’ different thresholds for social learning. For several reasons
(an agent’s risk preference, her assumptions about the size and shape of the
landscape and the length of her career, etc.), some agents prefer to collect
immediate epistemic payoff from individual learning rather than investing in
expected future gain from social learning, whereas others value long-term suc-
cess more.
At each time step, every agent follows the same decision procedure. All
agents on the landscape are potentially visible to each other as sources of
social information (based on their ability to broadcast their findings through
publications, conference presentations, etc.), and at each turn every agent
gets to observe the differences in epistemic significance between her approach
and those of others. She compares the expected payoff from social learning
to the assumed gain from doing individual search in her local neighborhood,
and decides which kind of research (social or individual learning) to conduct
during the following time step.7 More specifically, the decision procedure goes
as follows:
ASK: Is the epistemic significance of the current patch higher than
or equal to the one on previous time step?
If YES: Do not alter heading.
If NO:
Calculate the highest expected payoff from social learning
(for details, see below).
ASK: Is that payoff higher than agent's threshold
i for social learning?
If YES: Take new heading hi towards the most successful peer
If NO: ASK: Are there any higher patches in the agent's
Moore neighborhood?
If YES: Take heading hi towards a randomly
selected higher patch
If NO: Set velocity vi to 0
Move with velocity vi to heading hi
In this stepwise heuristic, an agent could calculate the expected payoffs
from social and individual learning in various ways. In the current simulations
we focus on the case where agents are motivated simply by gain in their epis-
temic significance level, i.e. trying to find as significant a research approach as
possible. The behavioral rule used by the agents in the simulations reported
in the next section is consistent with them conducting a simple cost-benefit
analysis of whether to engage in social learning: The benefit from social learn-
ing (sj;i) is the difference in epistemic significance level of the agent i and
7 For applications of similar social-learner-explorer strategies in the literature on cultural
inheritance and evolution, see Enquist et al (2007) and Borenstein et al (2008).
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Fig. 3 The cognitive diversity in the population can be visualized as agents having ”cones of
vision” of different breadths. Given A, agent A would consider B, but not C, as a potential
source of social information.
another agent j. The distance between the two agents’ approaches determines
the time t it takes for i to adopt j’s approach, and hence it represents the
foregone possibilities for individual exploration. Each agent is characterized
by a particular value of the social-learning threshold i. An agent engages in
social learning if
i <
sj;i
t
(1)
In other words, if at a particular time in the simulation the expected gain
per timestep from adopting a fellow scientist’s approach exceeds the agent’s
social-learning threshold i, she chooses social learning. However, if there are
currently no agents around following whom would exceed the threshold, an
agent defaults to individual learning, which is implemented as a satisficing
form of gradient climbing (similar to the control rule in the EL model). Hence,
i can be understood as the agent’s expectation about the average increase in
significance level that she can obtain from individual learning.8
Geometrically, the cognitive diversity in the population can be represented
as each agent having a ”cone of vision” of particular breadth, within which
she agrees to pursue a more successful approach of a peer (Figure 3). Indi-
vidualist scientists – like Tesla, at least when portrayed as in the example in
section 1 – could be seen as having a narrow cone of vision, whereas less ambi-
tious members of the research workforce are happy to settle for social-learning
opportunities of smaller expected payoff, and hence have broader cones.
8 Simulation experiments were also run with agents who, instead of aiming for maximum
significance level, aim to maximize the epistemic work done over a future time period, and yet
more sophisticated ones who try to take landscape depletion into account by exponentially
discounting for distant payoffs based on . Such decision rules result in a field of vision
delimited by a surface of revolution drawn by a non-linear function. Careful analysis of
such situations must be left as a task for future work, but in initial experimentation the
differences in the shape of the cone did not lead to qualitative changes in the results.
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To summarize, all the agents in the population share the structurally same
decision procedure, and the cognitive diversity concerns their different ten-
dencies to engage in social learning. Unlike in the EL model where diversity is
represented in terms of discrete agent categories, the model allows continuous
variation, and social learning thresholds can be drawn freely from a continuous
distribution. This way of representing cognitive diversity avoids the problem-
atic artifacts resulting from the EL model’s all-or-nothing implementation of
the different learning profiles, and crucially, the new implementation of the
learning heuristics captures the idea that social learning can help avoid myopia
and motivate long-term projects involving movement downhill through areas
of lower significance.
Apart from these modifications, other structural assumptions in the model
are the same as in the EL model.
4 Results
In the simulations, the behavior of a population consisting of 50 agents was
studied on a 101x101 toroidal landscape. The central question of interest con-
cerned how the different tendencies for social learning present in the scientist
population affect its epistemic efficiency on different kinds of landscapes. Vari-
ations in environment structure were introduced by varying the smoothness
of the landscape and the levels of the time scale parameter .
4.1 Smooth landscapes
On a smooth landscape resembling that of the original EL model, social learn-
ing does not increase the epistemic efficiency of a population of agents. Instead,
exploration of the parameter space (summarized in Table 1; more extensive
data available in the supplementary materials, documents 1 and 2) shows that
for all values of the time scale parameter , the epistemic work done by the
community slightly increases as values of  in the population increase, that
is, when agents become less eager to engage in social learning. Similarly, di-
verse populations with lambdas drawn from a uniform distribution U(1; 100)
slightly outperform pure populations of social learners.9
In addition to epistemic work, the performance of the different kinds of pop-
ulations of agents was also measured by keeping track of epistemic progress,
a modified version of the measure used by Weisberg and Muldoon. Epistemic
progress is defined as the proportion of visited patches among all significant
(elevation >100 units) patches, and it reflects how exhaustively the patches
on the two hills of significance have been visited at a particular time. For
9 However, as the value of  becomes smaller, harvesting epistemic significance from a
patch becomes slower, and movement on the landscape becomes relatively less costly. Con-
sequently, the choice of a search heuristic becomes less critical. Real research topics with
small lambdas would be ones where changing one’s approach is relatively quick compared
to the time it takes to produce results by using a chosen approach.
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Table 1 Epistemic work W in diverse and non-diverse populations on a smooth landscape.
Progress measured at t=400. Italics indicate the most efficient population type.
Depletion rate individual learners social learners diverse population
  N(100; 1)   N(1; 1)   U(1; 100)
 = 0:001 7:14  10 2 7:00  10 2 7:25  10 2
 = 0:01 0.405 0.401 0.411
 = 0:1 0.934 0.897 0.939
smooth landscapes, epistemic progress leads to very similar conclusions as
those suggested by epistemic work: Social learning does not improve epistemic
progress, and the differences between the three kinds of populations are rather
insignificant (see supplementary materials, documents 1 and 2).10
The categories represented in the columns of the table feature also in the
subsequent simulations discussed below. These particular categories were cho-
sen for presenting the results for two reasons. First, they capture the range of
relevant variation in the social-learning thresholds. Experimentation with the
model shows that most of the variation in the social-learning thresholds that
influences epistemic work occurs when values of  fall between 1 and 100.11
Secondly, the categories make it easy to draw qualitative conclusions from
the model. A social-learning threshold of 1 represents an agent who only needs
to expect a gain of one unit of epistemic significance per time period from
social learning in order to engage in it. In contrast, an alpha of 100 represents
a strongly individualist learning profile, where an agent on the zero-significance
plane only decides to follow a peer on the global peak (at 1000 units) when the
distance between them is less than 10 units. Henceforth, I refer to these kinds
of agents as as social learners and individual learners, respectively. Finally,
cognitively diverse populations are modeled either by increasing the variance
of the distribution from which alphas are drawn or by constructing mixed
populations by merging sub-populations of social and individual learners.
These results seem to conflict with those obtained by Weisberg and Mul-
doon. According to my model, on the smooth landscape examined also in the
EL model, individual learning ( control agent rule) is more efficient than
the use of social information, and diversity in the population produces only
very small effects. This is hardly surprising, however. Visual inspection of the
simulation runs reveals that both individual and social learners find the two
peaks on the landscape, albeit in different ways. Whereas a population of indi-
vidual learners gets evenly distributed on both hills, groups of agents with low
social-learning thresholds harvest the epistemic significance mass in a sequen-
tial manner: As one of the agents happens to find the higher peak, the whole
10 Thanks to the anonymous referee for insisting on the use of alternative measures of
epistemic success.
11 Due to the nature of the model (see the discussion in Section 5), the qualitative results
from the model should not depend on the choice of particular point values for the parameters.
The scaling of the parameter space was chosen mainly for convenience and for its continuity
with the EL model.
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group flocks to that hill. Only after the whole hill is depleted does the popula-
tion start to search for another. Once the other hill is found, the agents repeat
the same flocking procedure.12 What makes individual learners slightly more
effective is the robustness of their strategy: Both hills of epistemic significance
are investigated in parallel, whereas social learners often end up spending a
long time searching for the second peak. As is seen below, this difference in
collective search strategy turns out to be quite important on more complex
landscapes.
4.2 Rugged landscapes
As was argued in Section 2, the collective problem-solving tasks in real scien-
tific research can hardly be represented by smooth landscapes. It also turns
out that the most interesting dynamics of the broadcasting model occur on
more complex landscapes.
To study research topics with dead-end research approaches, noise consist-
ing of small amplitude two-dimensional Gaussian bumps (Gaussian kernels)
was added onto the landscape (see Fig 1). Figure 4 shows that as the amount of
ruggedness increases (the number of bumps denoted by ), the search problem
obviously becomes harder for all kinds of agents. Notice, however, that this
is where the power of social learning starts to show: Because the individual
learners easily get trapped on local maxima, their performance drops more
than that of agents with lower social-learning thresholds.13
Table 2 reveals that the difference in performance between social and indi-
vidual learners is sensitive to the time-scale parameter, the advantage of social
learners being larger for small values of lambda. At large values of lambda
(  0:1), the effect is again reversed and a population of individual learn-
ers can be more effective than social learners.14 In the following, I focus on
the case where lambda is 0.01, because it nicely captures the conditions in a
research field where coordination and division of cognitive labor are needed:
When  = 0:01, it takes one agent roughly 500 time steps to deplete a patch
to a 1/100 of its original height, i.e. to produce nearly all of the significant
results available by using that approach. With a population size of 50, this
leads to a situation where during a 1000-round simulation, the population can
deplete both hills of epistemic significance only with coordinated effort. Large
values of lambda represent less interesting cases, where the problem faced by
the community is easy enough so that only a handful of agents who happen
12 Animations of individual simulation runs with different kinds of populations can be
found in the online supplementary materials.
13 As the ruggedness of the landscape increases even more, local search heuristics generally
become less and less useful, and even the diverse communities make little progress. Such
landscapes can be seen to represent research problems beyond the cognitive capacities of the
scientist agents, where attaining significant results becomes increasingly a matter of luck.
14 As document 1 in the supplementary materials shows, these results hold remarkably
well across beta values ranging from 50 to 300, and across different times of measurement.
Value of cognitive diversity in science 17
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Ruggedness (β)
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
e
p
is
te
m
ic
 w
o
rk
 d
o
n
e
 a
t 
t=
4
0
0
individual learners
social learners
diverse population
Fig. 4 Example of epistemic work on rugged landscapes. (t = 400;  = 0:01). See supple-
mentary materials document 3 for a more comprehensive presentation of the results.
Table 2 Epistemic work on rugged landscapes ( = 200)
Depletion rate individual learners social learners diverse population
  N(100; 1)   N(1; 1)   U(1; 100)
 = 0:001 9:49  10 3 3:79  10 2 2:10  10 2
 = 0:01 7:36  10 2 0.146 0.128
 = 0:1 0.411 0.340 0.445
to find the hills of epistemic significance can exhaust them on their own, and
there is no need for successful community-wide learning and coordination.
Hence, the first result of interest on rugged landscapes is the necessity of
social learning to overcome getting stuck on local maxima. The mechanism
underlying the success of social learners is the following. In a population of
social learners, a large group of scientists can take advantage of one of their
peers landing on a successful research approach. Commitment to adopting the
approach of a peer provides scientists a rationale to accept temporary losses in
the epistemic significance level due to ruggedness of landscape, when promised
longer-term large rewards.
However, although a population consisting of social learners is significantly
more efficient than a population of individual learners, it suffers from a prob-
lem of its own – herding.15 When all agents are sensitive to social information,
the whole population often ends up on one of the two hills. As already de-
scribed above, once the hill is depleted, members of the population have no
15 By herding, I refer to undesirable behavior where agents do what others do even in
situations where they should be relying on their own information (Banerjee 1992).
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information about the location (or even existence) of the other hill on the land-
scape. Because ruggedness makes rediscovery difficult, often such populations
fail to discover the other hill during 1000 simulation rounds.
This suggests that perhaps adding a few individual agents into an oth-
erwise social learner population might improve its exploratory capacities. As
Figure 5 suggests, this is indeed what happens. In a population of 50, replacing
10 agents, who have low social learning thresholds, with agents strongly pre-
ferring individual learning significantly increases the population’s efficiency.
Especially at later stages of search (after 500 rounds), a mixed population
performs clearly better. This is because, with high probability, in the mixed
population at least one of the individualist agents remains on the hill ig-
nored by social learners. Once the first hill is sufficiently depleted (around 500
rounds), the individualist agent(s) can guide the majority to the new source
of significance.16
Adding 10-20% individual learners both increases the epistemic work done
by the community and improves the reliability of the population in finding
both hills on the landscape. However, having more than 20% of individual
learners in the population is counterproductive. As more individual learners
are added, more agents get stuck on local maxima, and the collective efficiency
decreases.17 Hence, at least when faced with moderately challenging research
topics (in terms of  and ), a mixed population consisting of a few individual
learners together with a large majority of social learners achieves the best
epistemic outcomes.
4.3 Summary
The three most important above results can be summarized as follows:
1. On smooth landscapes, no social learning or cognitive diversity is needed
for efficient epistemic work. In fact, populations of agents following social-
learning heuristics suffer slightly from herding, whereas individual learning
leads to effective exploration and division of labor between agents.
2. On rugged landscapes, individual learners easily get stuck on local maxima,
and populations of social learners achieve significantly better outcomes.
3. The power of cognitive diversity shows on landscapes corresponding to
moderately challenging research topics. Mixed populations consisting mostly
16 Measuring epistemic progress (see supplementary material, documents 3 and 4) sug-
gests a further advantage of diversity. Unlike populations of social learners, given enough
time, diverse populations and populations of individual learners do not leave behind unexam-
ined significant patches on the landscape. This is due to their local search strategy: Agents
conducting individual learning only leave a neighborhood of patches once all its patches
have been depleted. Hence, in this way, diversity can make the population of scientists more
pedantic in its work.
17 As full results reported in document 4 in the supplementary materials confirm, the
ordering in Figure 5 is stable across the whole range of examined  values. However, for the
higher ruggedness values ( 2 [200; 300]), adding some extra individual learners can lead to
a small additional payoff in last stages of the 1000-round simulation run.
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Fig. 5 Homogeneous and diverse populations on rugged landscapes ( = 100,  = 0:01)
of social learners with a minority (in the current simulations, 10-20% per-
cent) of individualistic agents who tend to ignore social information are
more effective than a homogeneous population of social learners.
Together these results suggest the more general observation that no learn-
ing strategy is per se more rational than others, but instead the efficiency
of individual learning, social learning, and the usefulness of cognitive diver-
sity all depend on the task faced by the community. In order to achieve good
outcomes, a correct mix of agents employing different learning rules must be
applied in the right context.18
Compared to the EL model, these results provide a more fine-grained, and
as I have argued, more realistic, view of the conditions and processes related
to cognitive diversity. Looking at individual simulation runs confirms that a
mixed population performs best on rugged landscapes because it combines
effective exploitation of socially learned information with exploration of new
patches conducted by more individualistic agents: The success of a search
conducted by the social learners is sensitive to their initial distribution on the
landscape, and adding some individual learners in the population increases the
probability that both peaks are found. Therefore, although social learners can
be fast, individual learners improve the reliability of the search and reduce
variance in the amount of epistemic work conducted over several trials.
18 The interaction effects between task difficulty and the distribution of social learning
thresholds shows in Table 2, where no column dominates the others. For example, at different
values of , pure social learning can be the best, second, or even the worst learning heuristic
among the three.
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5 Discussion
Before concluding, I address some concerns regarding the reliability of these
results, their interpretation, and their implications for understanding real sci-
ence and research policy.
First, the generality and relevance of the findings from the broadcasting
model might raise concerns. Compared to analytical models, agent-based mod-
els usually come with more parameters, and the results often only hold in lim-
ited parts of the parameter space. However, as Marchi and Page (2014) point
out, this should not be seen as a general shortcoming of agent-based modeling.
Instead, the expansion of the parameter space is a result of having to actually
run the simulation on a computer. In computational modeling even seemingly
trivial modeling choices (regarding, e.g., timing, learning, interaction) must
be made explicit. In analytical modeling it is easier for similar assumptions to
go unnoticed, but this does not reduce the modeler’s responsibility to justify
such choices.
One possible strategy for meeting the challenge of relevance for real-world
science would be to calibrate the model with empirical data. However, data
about the difficulty of scientific problems, learning strategies employed by sci-
entists, and dependencies between aspects of research approaches is not readily
available – and often it is not even clear how relevant evidence should be ob-
tained. So while empirical calibration is a laudable aim, it remains outside
the scope of my current endeavor. The model presented in this paper serves
a different purpose. Rather than being a high-fidelity model of a particular
target system in the world, it could be called a how-possibly model or an in-
tuition engine (Marchi and Page 2014) aimed to reveal qualitatively described
dependencies between the components of the model – the broadcasting model
is designed to illuminate the micro-mechanisms mediating cognitive diversity,
coordination, and problem-solving efficiency.
One should always be cautious about drawing conclusions about real sci-
ence based on results from a simple theoretical model. I share Alexander and
his coauthors’ worry that, since the true nature of epistemic landscapes in
real science is beyond our knowledge, an epistemic landscape model cannot
directly be used to argue for the desirability of cognitive diversity in a par-
ticular scientific field. I believe, however, that epistemic landscape modeling
can legitimately serve a more modest role: Agent-based models which have
not been calibrated with empirical data can be conceived as computational
thought experiments, where modeling assumptions are seen as premises and
results as conclusions from extended arguments (Beisbart 2012). Hence, the
modeling results are of a conditional nature. They answer questions on what
would happen to epistemic efficiency (and why), given certain hypothetical
ranges of parameter values, learning heuristics, and the rest of the model struc-
ture. From this perspective, agent-based models in philosophy can be seen as
argumentative devices, and the added value of agent-based modeling resides
in their usefulness in deriving simple conclusions from a massive number of
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premises (regarding, for example, distributions of the cognitive properties of
agents).
Furthermore, Ylikoski and Aydinonat (2014) have recently argued that the
epistemic contribution of abstract theoretical models can often only be un-
derstood in the context of a cluster of models of the same phenomenon. This
suggests that we should not study the explanatory contributions of different
epistemic landscape models in isolation, but instead see these computational
thought experiments as variations on a theme, as a family of models with
similar explananda and explanantia. Exploration of the parameter space of a
single model provides information about the robustness of modeling results
within the scope of modeling assumptions embodied in that particular model.
In like manner, cross-model comparisons allow more general robustness as-
sessments in light of the variation of modeling assumptions within the model
cluster. Therefore, general results to be drawn from the model cluster should
typically be ones which can be shown to be immune to changes in the auxiliary
assumptions.
Insofar as the epistemic landscape models put forward by Weisberg and
Muldoon, Thoma, Alexander and his coauthors, and myself all share the same
basic model structure, they definitely form a cluster within which compar-
isons across models can increase our understanding of the target phenomenon.
The main differences between these models concern changes in the behavioral
rules of the agents and the way epistemic performance is measured: Alexander
and his coauthors’ examination of the swarm rule is basically a replication of
the original EL model with the addition of a new homogeneous population
engaging in flocking behavior. Similarly, Thoma slightly changes the way col-
lective epistemic performance is measured, suggests new implementations of
the maverick and follower rules, and examines the usefulness of diversity when
the assumption of strict locality of search and movement is relaxed.
Like Thoma’s model, also the broadcasting model extends social learn-
ing beyond the immediate Moore neighborhood. However, unlike Thoma’s
model, it does not allow non-local movement (jumping), and it derives the
choice between individual and social learning from rudimentary cost-benefit
analysis done by the scientist agents. Together with the implemented agent-
environment interaction (landscape depletion) and examination of rugged land-
scapes, these changes make the broadcasting model perhaps the clearest de-
parture from the original EL model. However, as was pointed out above (see
footnote 6), similar modifications were envisioned already by Weisberg and
Muldoon as worthwhile extensions of their work.
As this article’s starting point and its target of critical appraisal has been
the original EL model, more detailed comparisons between the broadcasting
model and those put forward by Thoma and Alexander et al. must be left for
future work. It should, however, be noted that results from the broadcasting
model differ in interesting ways from findings in the other models. In contrast
to Thoma’s findings, my model suggests that on smooth landscapes there is no
noticable benefit from diversity. However, when compared to Alexander and
his coauthors’ results, the broadcasting model paints a more positive picture of
22 Samuli Pöyhönen
the usefulness of social learning and diversity in more complex problem-solving
situations. By showing how the usefulness of social learning and cognitive di-
versity are related to the difficulty of the problem, the broadcasting model goes
some way towards explaining the prima facie contradictory results obtained
in the earlier models.
The cautious conclusion to be drawn from these differences is that, in its
entirety, the relationship between diversity and epistemic performance is likely
to be more complex than can be captured by any simple model. Nonetheless,
the model cluster approach to the epistemology of theoretical modeling sug-
gests that instead of trying to determine which model provides the correct
picture of cognitive diversity, each model could be seen as a candidate for illu-
minating some possible scenarios and processes related to cognitive diversity.
By tracing differences in outcomes to differences in modeling assumptions,
the different models can together be seen to lead to a clearer picture of the
potential and correct interpretation of epistemic landscape modeling – and
more generally, to a better understanding of the possible mechanisms through
which cognitive diversity influences the conduct of scientific research.
6 Conclusion
Diversity clearly makes a difference in the research community. The broad-
casting model suggests that the picture of the micro-mechanisms mediating
cognitive diversity and epistemic efficiency is roughly the following: Cognitive
diversity produces efficient division of labor between scientists by maintaining
a beneficial mix of exploration and exploitation in the population. In simple
research domains where areas of high epistemic significance are easily iden-
tifiable, no social learning between agents is needed for good coordination.
However, on rugged landscapes which better capture the complexity of scien-
tific problem-solving, the presence of social learners is crucial for enabling the
population to converge to research approaches of high epistemic significance.
However, high occurrence of social learning increases the unreliability of the
research process due to herding behavior.
My results suggest that for moderately demanding research topics, the
best mix of problem-solving speed and reliability is reached by a cognitively
diverse population of scientists, where most of the agents are eager to engage
in social learning, counterbalanced by a minority of individualistic researchers
who mostly conduct explorative research on their own. In such a population,
most of the epistemic work is done by the majority of agents highly sensitive
to social information about the currently most efficient research approaches.
However, maverick scientists are indispensable for providing an alternative to
the consensus, ensuring that the community does not lose sight of valuable
research approaches currently ignored by the conformist majority.
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